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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici are Catholic organizations that represent 
the interests of Catholic laity, workers, women, chil-
dren, and LGBT people. Amici believe as a matter of 
their deep Catholic faith that religious freedom is the 
right of every person, Catholic, non-Catholic, female, 
male, gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, worker, and 
dependent. If the Petitioners receive the exemption 
from the contraceptive benefit of the Affordable Care 
Act that they request from this Court, hundreds of 
thousands of Catholic and non-Catholic women and 
their families across the country could be deprived of 
their right to make their own decisions of conscience 
about healthcare. Amici respectfully bring these em-
ployees’ voices to this Court, asking this Court to rec-
ognize that women’s reproductive rights and religious 
liberty should not be defeated by a religious exemp-
tion that leaves contraceptive coverage unavailable to 
women employees and their families. 
 If Petitioners are successful in this case, Catholic 
Amici also anticipate that Catholic organizations – 
schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and social 
services agencies – will be pressured by the bishops to 
 
 1 No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary contribu-
tion intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
No persons other than the Amici or their counsel made a mon-
etary contribution to this brief ’s preparation or submission. All 
parties have consented in writing to the filing of this amicus 
brief. 
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oppose health insurance benefits for same-sex couples 
and their dependents; refuse maternity care to single 
women and married couples who bear children with 
the aid of reproductive technology; deny adoptive chil-
dren to gay and lesbian parents; and fire non-Catholic 
and non-ministerial Catholic employees for getting 
married, supporting same-sex marriage or reproduc-
tive rights, bearing children with the help of reproduc-
tive technology, using contraception, and exercising 
other constitutional rights. 
 Catholics for Choice (CFC) represents the 
majority of Catholics on issues of sexual and repro-
ductive rights and health, and is the leading voice in 
debates at the intersection of faith, women’s health, 
reproductive choice, and religious liberty. Founded in 
1973, CFC seeks to shape and advance sexual and 
reproductive ethics that are based on justice, reflect a 
commitment to women’s well-being, and respect and 
affirm the capacity of women and men to make moral 
decisions about their lives. CFC’s work promotes re-
spect for the moral autonomy of every person, based 
on the foundational Catholic teaching that every in-
dividual must follow his or her own conscience and 
respect others’ right to do the same. 
 Call To Action is one of the largest organiza-
tions working for equality and justice in the Catholic 
Church today. With over 25,000 members and sup-
porters and 50 chapters nationally, Call To Action 
educates, inspires and activates Catholics to act for 
justice and build inclusive communities. In doing so, 
Call To Action does not condone discrimination on the 
3 
basis of sexual identity, conscience decisions, and/or 
personal decision-making that does not conform to in-
stitutional Catholic dictates.  
 CORPUS is an international Catholic organiza-
tion representing the vast majority of Roman Catho-
lics seeking an inclusive priesthood. This inclusivity 
affirms the human and reproductive rights of women 
and men.  
 A Critical Mass: Women Celebrating Eucha-
rist (ACM) is a community that empowers women in 
the Roman Catholic tradition through dialogue and 
liturgy. ACM is an open and welcoming community 
that was born out of theological reflection, faith shar-
ing, and desire for an inclusive role for women in the 
Catholic Church.  
 DignityUSA was founded in 1969 and is an or-
ganization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) Catholics and supporters. Among the areas of 
concern outlined in its Statement of Position and 
Purpose is the promotion of “equal access and justice 
in all areas of healthcare and healing.” DignityUSA is 
concerned that LGBT people could be denied equal 
access to healthcare services if employers are allowed 
to restrict healthcare coverage on the basis of the 
religious belief of the owners. 
 The National Coalition of American Nuns 
(NCAN) began in 1969 to study and speak out on 
issues of justice in church and society. Among other 
things, NCAN calls on the Vatican to recognize 
and work for women’s equality in civil and ecclesial 
4 
matters, to support gay and lesbian rights, and to 
promote the right of every woman to exercise her pri-
macy of conscience in matters of reproductive justice. 
 New Ways Ministry represents Catholic lay 
people, priests, and nuns who work to ensure that the 
human dignity, freedom of conscience, and civil rights 
of LGBT people are protected in all circumstances, 
including in making decisions about healthcare. New 
Ways Ministry is a national Catholic ministry of jus-
tice and reconciliation for people and the wider Cath-
olic Church. Through education and advocacy, New 
Ways Ministry promotes the full equality of LGBT 
people in church and society. New Ways Ministry’s 
network includes Catholic parishes and college cam-
puses throughout the United States. 
 The Quixote Center/Catholics Speak Out is a 
faith-based organization that urges Catholics to take 
adult responsibility for their lives. This includes mak-
ing decisions according to one’s conscience regarding 
reproductive rights.  
 The Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics 
and Ritual (WATER) is a non-profit educational 
organization made up of justice-seeking people, from 
a variety of faith perspectives and backgrounds, who 
promote the use of feminist religious values to make 
social change. WATER believes that women’s health 
decisions are private, and that the community’s re-
sponsibility is to make healthcare available for every-
one. WATER participates in this amicus brief because 
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a just society both respects privacy and promotes 
health. 
 The Women’s Ordination Conference (WOC), 
founded in 1975, is the oldest and largest national 
organization that works to ordain women as priests, 
deacons and bishops into an inclusive and account-
able Catholic Church. WOC affirms women’s gifts, 
openly and actively supports women’s voices, and rec-
ognizes and values all ministries that meet the spir-
itual needs and human rights of all people. WOC 
promotes respect and self-determination of all people 
based on personal discernment. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Catholic Amici believe as a matter of their 
profound religious faith that religious freedom is a 
universal right required by the dignity of the human 
person. Because the fundamental human right to re-
ligious freedom is rooted in human dignity, Amici 
believe that religious freedom is the right of every 
person, Catholic and non-Catholic, female and male, 
worker and dependent. See Second Vatican Council, 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, in The Documents 
of Vatican II 675, 679 (Walter M. Abbott, S.J. ed., 
1966) (“[T]he right to religious freedom has its 
foundation in the very dignity of the human person as 
this dignity is known through the revealed word of 
God and by reason itself.”); see also John Courtney 
Murray, The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 
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Bridging the Sacred and the Secular 198-99 (J. Leon 
Hooper ed., 1994) (“The foundation of the right [to 
religious freedom] is the truth of human dignity.”). On 
behalf of the hundreds of thousands of Catholic and 
non-Catholic employees of religious organizations and 
their dependents, Amici urge this Court to recognize 
the religious freedom interests of those employees in 
the birth control benefit of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) by rejecting the Petitioners’ request for a com-
plete exemption from the requirement to provide this 
important health insurance benefit.  
 “Among the reasons the United States is so open, 
so tolerant, and so free is that no person may be 
restricted or demeaned by government in exercising 
his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exer-
cise unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, 
in protecting their own interests, interests the law 
deems compelling.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2786-87 (2014) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq., 
does not require the Petitioners’ proposed restrictions 
on the health and religious freedom interests of em-
ployees. The Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment prohibit them.  
 The Amici respectfully ask this Court to consider 
the interests of more than 71 million Catholics in the 
United States, 72 percent of whom support coverage 
for birth control in both private and government-run 
health insurance plans, and almost 80 percent of 
whom believe that using contraception is morally 
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acceptable. See P.J. Kenedy & Sons, The Official 
Catholic Directory Anno Domini 2047-87 (2015); 
Belden Russonello Strategists, Inc., Catholic Voters 
and Religious Exemption Policies 9 (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2014/documents/ 
11.17.14NationalCatholicVotersSurvey2014.pdf; Univi-
sion, Voice of the People (last visited Feb. 11, 2016), 
http://www.univision.com/noticias/la-huella-digital/la-
voz-del-pueblo/matrix. Among sexually-active Catho-
lic women, 99 percent have used contraception. See 
Guttmacher Institute, Fact Sheet: Contraceptive 
Use in the United States (Oct. 2015), http://www. 
guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html#6a; Catholics 
for Choice, The Facts Tell The Story: Catholics and 
Choice 4 (2014-2015), http://www.catholicsforchoice. 
org/topics/catholicsandchoice/documents/FactsTellthe 
Story2014.pdf. Additionally, in the realm of employ-
ment, the 17,755 Catholic parishes across the United 
States employ thousands of workers. The 639 Catho-
lic hospitals alone employ more than 516,410 full-
time employees and 220,795 part-time workers in 
addition to the tens of thousands of workers employed 
at the 438 ancillary care systems, medical centers, 
sanatoriums and hospices. See Catholic Health Asso-
ciation of the United States, Catholic Health Care in 
the United States 2 (Jan. 2016), https://www.chausa. 
org/docs/default-source/general-files/cha_mini_profile 
2016.pdf ?sfvrsn=2; Kenedy at 2047-87. The 233 
Catholic colleges and universities in the United States 
provide insurance coverage to hundreds of thousands 
of workers and their dependents, and educate more 
than 800,000 students. See Kenedy at 2047-87. 
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 Although RFRA requires that these employees’ 
compelling interests in religious and reproductive 
freedom be considered in any accommodation of their 
employers’ religious freedom, Petitioners and their 
Amici demand, not an accommodation, but a complete 
exemption from the contraceptive coverage require-
ment of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This over-
broad and total exemption would not only unduly 
restrict Catholic and non-Catholic women employees 
and their dependents from protecting their own com-
pelling interests in religious and reproductive free-
dom, but also involve the government in restricting 
and demeaning those employees’ exercise of religious 
and reproductive freedom. Thus the Petitioners’ pro-
posed exemption is prohibited by RFRA, which does 
not permit “requests for religious accommodations 
[that] become excessive, impose unjustified burdens 
on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize an 
institution’s effective functioning.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
544 U.S. 709, 711 (2005) (interpreting RFRA’s parallel 
statute, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq.).  
 In the Catholic world alone, the proposed exemp-
tion could restrict equal access to contraception for 
hundreds of thousands of workers and their depend-
ents. To apply RFRA properly, this Court “must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested accom-
modation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.” Cutter, 
544 U.S. at 720 (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). In this case, the burden on 
nonbeneficiary employees is unconstitutionally broad; 
9 
if this Court grants Petitioners’ exemption request, 
thousands of women could immediately lose their right 
of access to contraceptive insurance. In contrast to 
Hobby Lobby, in this case there is no “existing, recog-
nized, workable, and already-implemented framework 
to provide coverage,” and the “mechanism for doing so 
is [not] already in place.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2786. Thus the burden on employees’ rights would be 
immediate, excessive, and extreme if this Court were 
to grant Petitioners’ request for a complete exemption 
from the birth control benefit requirement. 
 This Court’s RFRA and RLUIPA “decisions indi-
cate that an accommodation must be measured so 
that it does not override other significant interests.” 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. Numerous significant inter-
ests are at stake in this case. In addition to the gov-
ernment’s “legitimate and compelling interest in the 
health of female employees,” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2786, the employees have religious freedom and 
reproductive freedom interests that will be negated if 
their employers are completely exempted from this 
provision of the ACA. An exemption for Petitioners 
would serve no compelling interests for either the 
government or the women affected. Moreover, under 
RFRA, the government’s proposed accommodation is 
the least restrictive means of furthering those specific 
reproductive and religious interests of women em-
ployees. It is difficult to imagine a less restrictive 
means than asking the Petitioners to do what they 
have already done, namely publicly assert their 
10 
objection to contraception and tell the government 
they do not want to pay for it. 
 Amici believe as a matter of their deep Catholic 
faith that all employees are equally entitled to cover-
age of contraceptive services under the ACA, no mat-
ter where they work or what they believe. They also 
believe that the least restrictive means of advancing 
the critical ideals of religious liberty and women’s 
equality would be to require all employers, including 
churches and their integrated auxiliaries, to provide 
access to contraception. They urge this Court to reject 
Petitioners’ argument that the government’s exemp-
tion of churches and integrated auxiliaries mandates 
an additional exemption for all religious organiza-
tions. If the government’s exemption of some church-
es but not other religious organizations violates 
RFRA and the Religion Clauses, as Petitioners argue, 
then the original exemption must be invalidated. An 
unconstitutional remedy does not cure a constitu-
tional violation, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 534 (1996), and a larger exemption does not 
solve the constitutional problems with the smaller ex-
emption that the government created here. 
 Moreover, under this Court’s precedents, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) lacked 
the constitutional authority to exempt the churches 
and their integrated auxiliaries from the ACA. King 
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). In these 
circumstances, RFRA does not require the broader ex-
emption requested by the Petitioners, and the Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit it.  
11 
 “At some point, accommodation [of religious free-
dom] may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of re-
ligion’ ” and violate the Establishment Clause. Corp. 
of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) 
(quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of 
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)). That point is reached 
here, where Petitioners reject every accommodation 
offered by the government and demand a complete 
exemption from the contraceptive benefit. Like the 
Connecticut statute that unconstitutionally “arm[ed] 
Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified 
right not to work on whatever day they designate 
as their Sabbath,” the requested exemption in this 
case violates the Establishment Clause through its 
“unyielding weighting in favor of [religious organi-
zations] over all other interests,” especially the in-
terests of Catholic women in furthering their 
reproductive health and protecting their religious 
freedom. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 
722.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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ARGUMENT 
I. RFRA REQUIRES THIS COURT TO TAKE 
ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF THE 
EMPLOYEES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 
WHO WOULD BE HARMED BY PETITION-
ERS’ EXEMPTION FROM THE CONTRA-
CEPTIVE BENEFIT REQUIREMENT.  
 This Court’s First Amendment cases have always 
considered the effects of religious accommodations 
on the well-being of third parties whose interests 
might be affected by the accommodation. In Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., for example, this Court in-
validated a Connecticut statute that gave Sabbatarians 
an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath be-
cause the statute took “no account of the convenience 
or interests of the employer or those of other employ-
ees who do not observe a Sabbath.” Caldor, 472 U.S. 
at 709. Similarly, in United States v. Lee, this Court 
rejected Amish employers’ requests for exemption 
from paying social security taxes because the exemp-
tion “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith 
on the employees.” 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
 This Court has interpreted both RLUIPA and its 
parallel statute, RFRA, to require the same analysis. 
Prisoners do not enjoy an absolute right to religious 
accommodations under RLUIPA. Their demands must 
be weighed against the “burden a requested accom-
modation may impose on nonbeneficiaries” and “meas-
ured so that [they do] not override other significant 
interests.” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720, 722. Courts enforc-
ing RLUIPA must evaluate prison officials’ and other 
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prisoners’ interests in an “appropriately balanced 
way,” id. at 722, and reject inmate requests that “im-
pose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized 
persons.” Id. at 726; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 
853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[A]ccom-
modating petitioner’s religious belief in this case 
would not detrimentally affect others who do not 
share petitioner’s belief.”).  
 Similarly, employers do not enjoy an absolute 
right to religious accommodations under RFRA. In 
Hobby Lobby, this Court explicitly rejected the sug-
gestion that RFRA requires accommodations “no mat-
ter the impact that accommodation may have on 
. . . thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby.” 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760; see also id. at 2783 
(“Our decision should not be understood to hold that 
an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall 
if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”). 
Vaccination-coverage requirements could be upheld 
against religious employers, for example, in order to 
protect third persons against the spread of infectious 
diseases and increase herd immunity. Id. at 2783. In 
other words, the religious freedom accommodations of 
employers must not “unduly restrict other persons, 
such as employees, in protecting their own interests, 
interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 2786-87 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 Petitioners’ requested exemption would inflict 
numerous harms on Catholic women employees and 
their dependents in an unbalanced manner that con-
tradicts the RFRA framework. These harms are both 
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material and dignitary. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva 
B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 
2516, 2566-78 (2015). The direct material harm is loss 
of the preventive services healthcare to which both 
the ACA and the government’s proposed accommo-
dation entitle employees. If Petitioners receive their 
exemption in this case, in contrast to Hobby Lobby, 
there is no “existing, recognized, workable, and already-
implemented framework to provide coverage,” and 
the “mechanism for doing so is [not] already in place.” 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786. Thus the burden on 
women employees’ rights would be immediate, exces-
sive, and extreme.  
 In contrast to this case, in Hobby Lobby the 
burden on women was “precisely zero.” Hobby Lobby, 
134 S. Ct. at 2760. If Petitioners receive their exemp-
tion from this Court, in the Catholic world alone 
hundreds of thousands of employees and their de-
pendents could lose access to contraceptive coverage. 
See generally Kenedy. Every employee of a Catholic 
organization in the United States could face the 
dilemma of “Sandra,” a science teacher at a Catholic 
school in the Midwest who did not want her real 
name revealed. Sandra’s careful financial planning 
with her husband about the costs of their insurance 
coverage unraveled because her insurance did not 
cover birth control. For the hundreds of thousands 
of employees of Catholic institutions nationwide, 
like Sandra and the other 163,000 lay teachers at 
Catholic elementary and high schools, whose family 
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budgets are directly tied to their insurance coverage, 
the burden of out-of-pocket costs for “birth control is a 
lot of extra money.” Catholics for Choice, Comments 
Re: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for 
Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care 
Act 4 (Jun. 19, 2012), http://www.catholicsforchoice. 
org/news/pr/2012/documents/6.19.2012CatholicsforChoice 
Comments_CMS-9968-ANPRM.pdf.  
 This Court has long recognized the dignitary 
harms associated with the “deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.” Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291-92 
(1964). Private Catholic employees suffer similar dig-
nitary harms whenever the government authorizes 
their employers to deny them access to benefits en-
joyed by their fellow citizens. On the subject of con-
traceptive access, in particular, the “refusal to furnish 
insurance covering contraception [inaccurately] labels 
an entire group of employees – women using certain 
contraceptives – as sinners.” Nejaime & Siegel at 
2575-76. Petitioners may believe that women who 
choose contraception are sinners; they are not enti-
tled to government ratification and enforcement of 
their belief. Employees have the constitutional right 
to make moral decisions in good conscience about 
what is best for their personal health and their fam-
ilies’ well being. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (use of contraception falls within the zone 
of privacy protected by the Constitution).  
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 Such denial of benefits also degrades the dig-
nitary free exercise rights of employees, which are 
protected by both the Constitution and the teachings 
of the Catholic church. Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2785 (“free exercise is essential in preserving 
. . . dignity”) with Second Vatican Council at 679 
(“[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation 
in the very dignity of the human person as this dig-
nity is known through the revealed word of God and 
by reason itself.”). 
 The Petitioners’ proposed exemption is especially 
“stigmatiz[ing] and demean[ing]” to Catholic women. 
Nejaime & Siegel at 2576. Since the 1960s, American 
Catholic women have used contraception in numbers 
that match their non-Catholic counterparts. They 
continue to do so now, even though, from the moment 
the government proposed the contraceptive coverage 
benefit, some of the Petitioners requested a complete 
exemption from the benefit because they believe 
contraception is always immoral. See Laura Bassett, 
The Men Behind the War on Women, Huffington Post, 
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/ 
01/the-men-behind-the-war-on_n_1069406.html; Leslie 
C. Griffin, The Catholic Bishops vs. the Contraceptive 
Mandate, 6 Religions 1411, 1415 (2015), http://www. 
mdpi.com/2077-1444/6/4/1411. 
 Both Catholic and non-Catholic women suffer 
dignitary harm whenever the government’s exemp-
tions and accommodations confer its imprimatur on 
the Catholic hierarchy’s decree that the use of con-
traception is morally forbidden to all, Catholic and 
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non-Catholic alike. Just as “the bakery owner who 
turns away a same-sex couple treats that particular 
couple as sinners,” the proposed exemption stigma-
tizes and demeans Catholic women by confirming, 
with government approval, their employers’ notion 
that women who use contraception act immorally. 
Nejaime & Siegel at 2576. 
 A strong majority of Catholic women (79 percent) 
have rejected the idea that the use of contraception is 
morally wrong, instead choosing in good conscience to 
make their own decisions about their personal health 
and family size. See Univision. RFRA does not require 
the government to allow employers to put employees 
in disadvantageous positions. RFRA does not require 
employers’ religious beliefs to trump those of their 
employees. That is not the way RFRA should work. 
See Oral Arg. Tr. at 33, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356) (Justice 
Kennedy: “[I]n a way, the employees are in a position 
where the government, through its healthcare plans, 
is – is, under your view, is – is allowing the employer 
to put the employee in a disadvantageous position. 
The employee may not agree with these religious – 
religious beliefs of the employer. Does the religious 
beliefs just trump? Is that the way it works?”). 
 The religious freedom rights of women employees 
of Catholic institutions also provide a compelling 
government interest that must be part of the RFRA 
analysis in this case. 
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II. THE GOVERNMENT’S ACCOMMODATION 
WAS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS 
TO PROTECT ITS COMPELLING INTER-
ESTS IN THE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 
AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF WOMEN 
EMPLOYEES OF CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS 
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS.  
 This Court has repeatedly held that “[c]ontext 
matters” in the application of the compelling govern-
mental interest standard. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723; 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). In this case, the context 
includes the rights of women employees and their 
dependents to access contraceptive insurance cover-
age. Therefore the heavy burden on nonbeneficiary 
women’s reproductive and religious freedom must 
“inform the analysis of the Government’s compelling 
interest and the availability of a less restrictive 
means of advancing that interest.” Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.  
 This Court has already recognized that the 
birth control benefit “furthers a legitimate and com-
pelling interest in the health of female employees.” 
Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The experience 
of Catholic and non-Catholic women employees dem-
onstrates that the government has an additional com-
pelling interest in protecting the religious freedom of 
employees who believe that their faith allows contra-
ceptive use. Because the Petitioners’ proposed exemp-
tion “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith 
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on the employees,” it must be rejected. Lee, 455 U.S. 
at 261. 
 From the time HHS first proposed the birth 
control benefit, Petitioners requested the complete 
exemption that the government eventually granted to 
churches and their integrated auxiliaries. See 26 
U.S.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) 
(defining the federal government’s complete exemp-
tion of “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and 
conventions or associations of churches,” as well as 
the “exclusively religious activities of any religious 
order” from the benefit). HHS’s repeated redrafting 
and reconsideration of both exemptions and accom-
modations to the contraceptive benefit requirement 
demonstrated the government’s concern about the ef-
fects of either an exemption or an accommodation on 
employees’ religious freedom. During the drafting of 
the church exemption, the government struggled to 
find the right language to protect the religious free-
dom rights of employees. Id. The government first 
justified the exemption by asserting that churches 
and integrated auxiliaries are “more likely than other 
employers to employ people of the same faith who 
share the same objection,” 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 
(Jul. 2, 2013), but then later removed a requirement 
that the exempted institutions primarily employ only 
people who share their faith. Id. at 39,873. 
 The history of this notice-and-comment process 
confirms that the government had a compelling in-
terest in protecting all employees’ religious liberty 
throughout the development of the accommodation 
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that Petitioners challenge in this case. The govern-
ment has thus met its heavy burden to “ ‘show with 
more particularity how its admittedly strong interest 
. . . would be adversely affected by granting an ex-
emption.’ ” O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431. In contrast to 
the government’s efforts, Petitioners’ proposed total 
exemption protects neither the compelling interest in 
women’s equality nor the compelling interest in 
women’s religious liberty. 
 The government’s compelling interest in employ-
ees’ religious freedom informs the least restrictive 
means analysis required by RFRA. The accommo-
dation, which only requires Petitioners to inform the 
government of their opposition to the contraceptive 
benefit and to provide minimal information about 
their insurance carriers, is the least restrictive means 
of respecting both Petitioners’ religious freedom and 
all employees’ rights not to be shut out of the insur-
ance marketplace because of their employers’ reli-
gious beliefs.  
 The government’s numerous efforts to accom-
modate the Petitioners while protecting employees’ 
rights demonstrate that, in this case, in contrast to 
Hobby Lobby:  
[T]here is no less restrictive, equally effective 
means that would both (1) satisfy the chal-
lengers’ religious objections to providing in-
surance coverage for certain contraceptives 
. . . ; and (2) carry out the objective of the 
ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirement, to 
ensure that women employees receive, at no 
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cost to them, the preventive care needed to 
safeguard their health and well being.  
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting); see also Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 868 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“[N]othing in the Court’s opinion sug-
gests that prison officials must refute every conceiv-
able option to satisfy RLUIPA’s least restrictive 
means requirement.”); Nejaime & Siegel at 2580-81 
(“If religious accommodation (1) would inflict material 
or dignitary harm on those the statute is designed to 
protect or (2) would produce effects and meanings 
that undermine the government’s society-wide objec-
tives, this impact is evidence that unimpaired en-
forcement of the law is the least restrictive means of 
furthering the government’s interest.”).  
 In this case, moreover, it is difficult to imagine a 
less restrictive means than asking the Petitioners to 
do what they have already done, namely publicly as-
sert their objection to contraception and tell the gov-
ernment they do not want to pay for it. 
 
III. THE CHURCH EXEMPTION DOES NOT 
PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
PETITIONERS’ COMPLETE EXEMPTION 
FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE BENEFIT 
REQUIREMENT. 
 During the notice-and-comments period about 
HHS’s proposed regulations regarding the coverage of 
preventive services under the ACA, Amicus Catholics 
for Choice (CFC) expressed its objections to granting 
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any institution or organization permission to deny its 
workers contraceptive coverage, or to require workers 
to navigate a complicated series of obstacles in order 
to obtain coverage. See Catholics for Choice, Com-
ments Re: NPRM: Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www. 
catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2013/documents/04.08.2013 
CatholicsforChoiceComments-CMS-9968-P.pdf. Amici 
remain convinced that completely excluding any wom-
an from equal access to contraception undermines the 
government’s equally compelling interests of protect-
ing religious liberty and advancing women’s equality. 
Any exemption draws arbitrary lines between those 
women whose consciences are worthy of respect and 
those deemed unworthy.  
 In comments submitted to HHS, CFC expressed 
its specific concern about the thousands of women 
already left completely out of contraceptive coverage 
by the church exemption, and the additional hun-
dreds of thousands of employees threatened by the 
proposed accommodation. Id. CFC noted that the fed-
eral government’s complete exemption of “churches, 
their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or asso-
ciations of churches,” as well as the “exclusively re-
ligious activities of any religious order” from the 
birth control benefit would restrict the rights of nu-
merous women church workers who make their own 
decisions of conscience about contraception. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a). The gar-
deners, secretaries, cleaners, cooks, and many others 
who work for the 17,755 parish churches around the 
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country should enjoy the same freedom as other 
American women to make decisions about their 
health and family size. 
 Also troubling to Amici is the government’s ini-
tial rationale for the church exemption. HHS first 
asserted that churches and integrated auxiliaries are 
“more likely than other employers to employ people of 
the same faith who share the same objection, and 
who would therefore be less likely than other people 
to use contraceptive services even if such services 
were covered under their plan.” 78 Fed. Reg. at 
39,874. This argument was falsely premised on the 
idea that members of the world’s religions always 
agree internally about morality. More specifically, 
the government’s assertion was factually inaccurate 
about Catholic parishes, dioceses, convents, and many 
other Catholic workplaces. Since the 1960s, American 
Catholic women have used contraception in numbers 
that match their non-Catholic counterparts. Griffin at 
1415. Among sexually-active Catholic women, 99 
percent have used a form of contraception opposed by 
the Catholic hierarchy. See Guttmacher Institute; 
Catholics for Choice, The Facts at 2. Clearly, Catholic 
women dissent in large numbers from the teaching of 
their church’s hierarchy that contraceptive use is 
always wrong. Thus the rationale of the government’s 
church exemption was flawed ab initio.  
 Amici’s fears about the original exemption were 
also buttressed by the very public role of the United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), 
who, from the beginning of the discussion of the 
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contraceptive benefit, requested an exemption for 
all Catholic employers – from parishes to dioceses, 
schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and social 
services agencies. The bishops developed an extensive 
lobbying campaign to persuade the Obama admin-
istration to cease the alleged war on religious liberty 
that the birth control benefit was supposed to repre-
sent. President Obama even met with New York’s 
Archbishop Timothy Dolan, then president of the 
USCCB, to discuss the “religious liberty issue.” See 
Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Open “Religious Liberty” 
Drive, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2011, at A14; see also Sara 
Hutchinson, It’s A Matter of Conscience, Albany Times 
Union, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.catholicsforchoice. 
org/news/op-eds/2012/Itsamatterofconscience.asp. The 
bishops, however, were advocating for their own 
religious beliefs; they do not represent the views of 
the Catholic people on the morality of contraception. 
The Catholic employees’ perspective on their own 
religious freedom was not reflected in the exemption. 
Griffin at 1415.  
 The bishops’ desired exemption included not only 
religious and secular nonprofit and for-profit employ-
ers, but also insurance companies and individual 
employees who did not want to participate in an 
insurance plan that sponsored contraceptive cover-
age. See Office of the General Counsel, Letter [to 
HHS] Re: Interim Final Rules on Preventive Services 
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/about/general-
counsel/rulemaking/upload/comments-to-hhs-on-preventive- 
services-2011-08-2.pdf. Were the bishops to get their 
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way, the number of affected employees could be enor-
mous. In Petitioner Zubik’s single diocese of Pitts-
burgh alone, for example, 165 Catholic non-profit 
organizations could subject their employees to this 
exclusion. Fifty of these organizations employ nearly 
8,600 workers, and the 88 Catholic elementary and 
high schools together employ 1,503 lay teachers. See 
Kenedy at 1069-73, 2075. For the 233 Catholic col-
leges and universities in the United States that alone 
employ nearly three-quarters of a million workers 
and enroll over 800,000 students, the loss of benefits 
could be tremendous. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2015) (At the 
University of Notre Dame alone, “Meritain adminis-
ters coverage for some 4600 employees of Notre Dame 
(out of a total of 5200) and 6400 dependents of em-
ployees. Aetna insures 2600 students and 100 de-
pendents.” Although Notre Dame is not a party to 
this case, Notre Dame has challenged the same ac-
commodation as Petitioners.); Brief Amicus Curiae of 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. in 
Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119 
& 15-191, at 25 (filed Jan. 8, 2016) (identifying num-
bers of Catholic students). 
 Because Catholic women overwhelmingly dis-
agree with the Catholic hierarchy about the morality 
of contraception, Amici agree with Petitioners that 
the church and integrated auxiliary exemption is 
arbitrary and utterly irrational. See Brief for Peti-
tioners in Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453 & 14-1505 [Pet’rs’ 
Brief I], at 55, 57, 59 (filed Jan. 4, 2016); Brief for 
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Petitioners in Nos. 15-35, 15-105, 15-119 & 15-191 
[Pet’rs’ Brief II], at 64-66 (filed Jan. 4, 2016). The 
exemption harms Catholic women’s religious liberty 
interest in making their own decisions about contra-
ceptive use. The exemption places the government on 
the Catholic hierarchy’s side of an internal religious 
liberty debate, particularly harming the employees 
who work at the 17,755 Catholic parishes and 171 
dioceses across the United States. See Kenedy at 
2047-87. Moreover, the exemption does not even con-
sider the religious freedom of non-Catholic employees 
of parishes and dioceses. In contrast, Amici’s Catholic 
faith teaches them to respect and protect non-
Catholics’ religious freedom equally with their own. 
 Amici disagree with Petitioners, however, about 
the appropriate remedy that RFRA requires for the 
flawed exemption developed by the Department of 
Health and Human Services. Petitioners argue that 
the original exemption should be expanded even fur-
ther. That proposed solution violates separation of 
powers principles. As Justice Kennedy suggested dur-
ing Hobby Lobby’s oral argument:  
[W]hat kind of constitutional structure do 
we have if the Congress can give an agency 
the power to grant or not grant a religious 
exemption based on what the agency de-
termined? . . . [W]hen we have a First 
Amendment issue of this consequence, 
shouldn’t we indicate that it’s for the Con-
gress, not the agency[,] to determine [who 
gets the exemption]? 
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Oral Arg. Tr. at 56-57, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); see also 
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (“had Congress wished to 
assign that question to an agency, it surely would 
have done so expressly”). 
 In these circumstances, it is neither the Peti-
tioners’ nor this Court’s job to rewrite the exemption 
in any way, whether to broaden it to include all 
religious organizations or to make it consistent with 
the way Congress drafted the exemption of certain 
religious employers in Title VII. See Pet’rs’ Brief II 40 
(suggesting Title VII’s statutory language as a model 
for analysis in this case). Congress’ clear intent in the 
ACA was to “require[ ] an employer’s group health 
plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish 
‘preventive care and screenings’ for women without 
‘any cost sharing requirements.’ ” Hobby Lobby, 134 
S. Ct. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)). 
The Petitioners’ proposed expanded exemption is not 
consistent with Congress’ stated goals to provide 
preventive healthcare services to all women. 
 An unconstitutional remedy does not cure a 
constitutional violation. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534. 
A larger exemption drafted by Petitioners or this 
Court would not solve the problems associated with 
a smaller one. It would also usurp Congress’ legiti-
mate role in developing accommodations that treat 
all religions equally, thereby allowing Petitioners to 
become a law unto themselves. See Employment Div., 
Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 890 (1990) (“[L]eaving accommodation to the 
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political process will place at a relative disadvantage 
those religious practices that are not widely engaged 
in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which 
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs.”).  
 In addition, in this case, piling one exemption 
upon another would violate the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment.  
 
IV. INTERPRETING RFRA TO REQUIRE THE 
PETITIONERS’ REQUESTED EXEMPTION 
WOULD VIOLATE THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT.  
 This Court has distinguished between religious 
exemptions and accommodations, which are permit-
ted by the “play in the joints” between the Religion 
Clauses, and religious preferences, which the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits. Compare Amos, 483 U.S. 
at 335, with Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10. The govern-
ment must heed this Court’s warning that “[a]t some 
point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful 
fostering of religion’ ” and violate the Establishment 
Clause. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (quoting Hobbie, 
480 U.S. at 145); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 587 (1992) (“The principle that government may 
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not 
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by 
the Establishment Clause.”). The point of unlawful 
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fostering of religion is reached with Petitioners’ pro-
posed exemption.  
 In Cutter, this Court observed that a religious 
exemption may violate the Establishment Clause in 
three different situations: if it does not take account 
of the burden of the exemption on nonbeneficiaries, if 
it is not applied neutrally among faiths, or if it gives 
an “unyielding” preference to religion. 544 U.S. at 
720; see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. 
Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722 (1994) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“[A] religious accommodation de-
mands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so 
burden nonadherents or so discriminate against other 
religions as to become an establishment.”). The Peti-
tioners’ requested exemption violates all three stan-
dards. 
 First, as Amici explained in Part I, the exemption 
completely ignores the material and dignitary harm 
to nonbeneficiary employees who have health, repro-
ductive freedom, and religious freedom interests in 
equal access to contraception under the law. The pro-
posed exemption’s failure to take account of these 
third-party interests not only defeats Petitioners’ 
RFRA claim, but also violates the Establishment 
Clause by giving a preference to employers’ religious 
interests over employees’ religious interests. This 
case can therefore be distinguished from this Court’s 
other decisions upholding exemptions, which gener-
ally “involve legislative exemptions that did not, or 
would not, impose substantial burdens on nonbene-
ficiaries while allowing others to act according to 
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their religious beliefs.” Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989). 
 Second, as Petitioners’ Briefs demonstrated in ex-
quisite detail, HHS’s church exemption favors some 
religious employers over others in a non-neutral and 
incoherent fashion. See Pet’rs’ Brief II 65 (“So, for 
example, a Unitarian Universalist church can decline 
to provide contraceptive coverage even if it has no 
religious objection and instead excludes the coverage 
purely for reasons of cost or convenience. The gov-
ernment is thus in the odd position of denying an 
exemption to some religious employers with sincere 
religious objections to the mandate, while exempting 
other religious employers who have no religious-
based objection to the mandate.”); Pet’rs’ Brief I 55 
(“The Government has also already decided to exempt 
certain religious organizations, and it has no legiti-
mate justification – much less a compelling justifica-
tion – for forcing other equally religious organizations 
to comply.”). Broadening the exemption would not in-
crease neutrality, as the Petitioners suggest. Instead, 
the proposed total exemption would unconstitution-
ally “advanc[e] religion” and “provide unjustifiable 
awards of assistance to religious organizations” at the 
expense of women’s reproductive and religious free-
dom rights. Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
 The reasonable Catholic observers represented 
by Amici urge this Court to consider that such a 
broad exemption would endorse the employers’ reli-
gion over that of employees in a non-neutral manner 
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in violation of the most fundamental principles of the 
Religion Clauses. See id. (“To ascertain whether the 
statute conveys a message of endorsement, the rele-
vant issue is how it would be perceived by an objec-
tive observer, acquainted with the text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute.”). 
 Third, the Petitioners’ proposed exemption gives 
an “unyielding weighting in favor of [religious or-
ganizations] over all other interests,” especially the 
equally important religious interests of Catholic and 
non-Catholic women employees to make their own 
decisions of faith about contraception. Caldor, 472 
U.S. at 709; Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. Thus, just like 
the Amish employers’ Free Exercise request for an 
exemption from paying social security taxes, Peti-
tioners’ proposed exemption must be rejected because 
it “operates to impose the employer’s religious faith 
on the employees.” Lee, 455 U.S. at 261. Moreover, 
just like the Connecticut statute that unconstitu-
tionally “arm[ed] Sabbath observers with an absolute 
and unqualified right not to work on whatever day 
they designate as their Sabbath,” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 
709, the requested exemption in this case violates 
the Establishment Clause by giving an unyielding 
weighting to the Catholic hierarchy’s religious inter-
ests over both the interests of Catholics who in good 
conscience disagree about the use of contraception as 
well as the interests of non-Catholic employees who 
work for Catholic organizations. 
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 In Caldor, this Court approvingly identified “a 
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, so well 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand”: 
“The First Amendment . . . gives no one the 
right to insist that in pursuit of their own in-
terests others must conform their conduct to 
his own religious necessities.”  
Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10 (quoting Otten v. Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
Amici endorse this constitutional principle as a mat-
ter of faith; as Catholics, Amici believe that every 
person must enjoy “freedom or immunity from coer-
cion in matters religious.” Second Vatican Council at 
681. Nonetheless, this coercion is precisely what Peti-
tioners demand in this case: the right to insist that 
Catholic women conform their conduct to the inter-
ests of their church’s hierarchy instead of to their own 
personal religious necessities. In defiance of the First 
Amendment, Petitioners request an “absolute and 
unqualified” exemption where “religious concerns 
automatically control over all secular interests in the 
workplace,” “no matter what burden or inconvenience 
this imposes on the . . . workers.” Caldor, 472 U.S. at 
709-10.  
 Neither RFRA nor the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment grants Petitioners a right to 
exemption from the ACA, and the Establishment 
Clause prohibits it. The exemption does not take ac-
count of the burden on nonbeneficiaries, is not applied 
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neutrally among faiths, and gives an “unyielding” 
preference to religion. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. 
 Amici urge this Court to consider that a grant 
of Petitioners’ requested exemption by this Court 
would result in a precedent of “startling breadth” that 
could threaten Catholic workers’ rights outside the 
contraceptive insurance context and compound the 
Establishment Clause violation already requested by 
Petitioners. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). If Petitioners are successful in 
this case, Amici anticipate that Catholic organiza-
tions – schools, universities, colleges, hospitals, and 
social services agencies – will be pressured by the 
bishops to oppose health insurance benefits for same-
sex couples and their dependents; refuse maternity 
care to single women and married couples who bear 
children with the aid of reproductive technology; deny 
adoptive children to gay and lesbian parents; and fire 
non-Catholic and non-ministerial Catholic employees 
for getting married, supporting same-sex marriage or 
reproductive rights, bearing children with the help of 
reproductive technology, using contraception, and 
exercising other constitutional rights. See, e.g., Ray 
Long et al., Gay Marriage Bill Off to Rough Start, 
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 3, 2013, at C4 (voicing Catholic 
objection that religious organizations would have to 
“provide health insurance to an employee’s same-sex 
spouse”); Herx v. Diocese of Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 
48 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (N.D. Ind.), appeal dismissed 
sub nom. Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 
772 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (Catholic school fired 
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married non-ministerial schoolteacher for using in 
vitro fertilization); Brief Amicus Curiae of United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops at 10 (record-
ing bishops’ objections to providing adoptive children 
to same-sex couples); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincin-
nati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355 (S.D. Ohio 
Jan. 30, 2013) (Catholic school fired non-Catholic 
Computer Technology Coordinator for use of artificial 
insemination); David-Elijah Nahmod, Assembly Panel 
Holds Hearing on Religious Workers’ Rights, Bay Area 
Reporter, Jul. 30, 2015, http://www.ebar.com/news/ 
article.php?sec=news&article=70789 (San Francisco 
archbishop tries to require non-Catholic and non-
ministerial employees to sign an employment con-
tract stating they are ministers who may not violate 
Catholic sexual norms); Barrett v. Fontbonne Acad., 
No. NOCV2014-751, 2015 WL 9682042 (Mass. Super. 
Dec. 16, 2015) (private Catholic school for girls re-
voked job offer to Food Service Director after he listed 
his husband as an emergency contact).  
 The best way to prevent RFRA from acquiring 
such “breadth and sweep” is for this Court “to ensure 
that interests in religious freedom are protected.” 
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). Amici respectfully ask this Court to ensure that 
the religious interests of Catholic and non-Catholic 
workers and their dependents are protected so that 
they may “preserv[e] their own dignity” and “striv[e] 
for a self-definition shaped by their religious pre-
cepts.” Id.  
---------------------------------  ---------------------------------   
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CONCLUSION 
 The Amici Curiae – Catholics for Choice, Call to 
Action, CORPUS, A Critical Mass, DignityUSA, the 
National Coalition of American Nuns, New Ways 
Ministry, the Quixote Center/Catholics Speak Out, 
the Women’s Alliance for Theology, Ethics and Ritual, 
and the Women’s Ordination Conference – respect-
fully ask this Court to reject Petitioners’ demand for a 
complete exemption from providing the birth control 
benefit of the Affordable Care Act and to affirm the 
judgments of the United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. 
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